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Password Guessing Without AI How Attackers Build Targeted Wordlists

Password Guessing Without AI How Attackers Build Targeted Wordlists

Password Guessing Without AI: How Attackers Build Targeted Wordlists

Passwords remain a persistent point of tension between usability and security. Attackers have long recognized this behavioral pattern and continue to exploit it. Rather than relying on artificial intelligence or sophisticated guessing algorithms, many credential attacks begin with something far simpler: harvesting contextual language and converting it into highly targeted password guesses.

Tools such as Custom Word List generators (CeWL) make this process efficient and repeatable without introducing additional technical complexity, significantly improving success rates while reducing noise and detection risk. This attacker behavior helps explain why NIST SP 800-63B explicitly advises against the use of context-specific words in passwords, including service names, usernames, and related derivatives.

The Role of CeWL

CeWL is an open-source web crawler that extracts words from websites and compiles them into structured lists. It is included by default in widely used penetration testing distributions such as Kali Linux and Parrot OS. Attackers use CeWL to crawl an organization’s public-facing digital presence and collect terminology that reflects how that organization communicates externally, including company service descriptions, internal phrasing, and industry-specific language. The effectiveness of this approach lies not in novelty, but in relevance; the resulting wordlists closely mirror the vocabulary users already encounter in their day-to-day work and are therefore more likely to influence password construction.

Configuring CeWL for Maximum Efficiency

CeWL can be configured to control crawl depth and minimum word length, allowing attackers to exclude low-value results. When harvested, the output forms realistic password candidates through predictable transformations. These terms serve as a foundational candidate set that attackers systematically modify using common patterns such as numeric suffixes, capitalization, or appended symbols to generate plausible password guesses.

Once attackers obtain password hashes, tools such as Hashcat apply these mutation rules at scale to test millions of targeted candidates efficiently. A key challenge is that many passwords generated in this way satisfy standard complexity requirements. Specops analysis of more than six billion compromised passwords suggests that organizations continue to struggle with this distinction. When passwords are constructed from familiar organizational language, added length or character variety does little to offset the reduced uncertainty introduced by highly contextual base terms.

Mitigating Wordlist-Based Attacks

Reducing exposure to wordlist-based attacks requires controls addressing password construction rather than complexity alone. Prevent users from creating passwords based on organization-specific language such as company and product names, internal project terms, industry vocabulary, and common attacker substitutions, while also blocking credentials that have already appeared in data breaches. Furthermore, enforce minimum length and complexity, requiring at least 15-character passphrases as length and unpredictability offer the best protection against brute-force techniques. Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA); while MFA does not prevent password compromise, it significantly limits the impact of credential exposure by preventing passwords from being used as a standalone authentication factor.

Align password policy with real-world attacks: enforcing policies that prevent context-derived, previously exposed, or easily inferred passwords reduces the value attackers gain from targeted wordlists, while MFA provides a necessary second line of defense when credentials are compromised.

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