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OPTIMJACK When Trusted JavaScript Becomes a Supply Chain Attack

OPTIMJACK When Trusted JavaScript Becomes a Supply Chain Attack

OPTIMJACK: When Trusted JavaScript Becomes a Supply Chain Attack

On November 16, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Web Experimentation platform to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects. Report URI researcher Scott Helme identified 188 infected snippets associated with 178 organizations, including Zoom, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, and HSBC. The attackers did not need to modify those organizations’ application source code or compromise their web servers. Instead, the malicious code was delivered through Optimizely snippets that affected websites already trusted.

Impact of the Attack

The payload could:

  • Replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses
  • Capture payment-card details entered into affected first-party forms
  • Collect non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots
  • Attempt to deliver exploit kits to some iPhone and iPad users

The campaign, named OPTIMJACK by independent researcher Amirul Cyber, highlights how a compromise of a trusted software provider can turn a routine third-party integration into a malware delivery channel. For organizations relying on third-party applications, JavaScript libraries, analytics platforms, and cloud services, this incident raises a fundamental question: how can enterprises trust software whose code can change after it has been approved?

Details of the Exploit

Optimizely Web Experimentation allows organizations to run A/B tests and personalize website experiences by loading JavaScript snippets associated with customer projects. According to Report URI, the attacker inserted a small JavaScript loader into the Project JavaScript configuration of affected projects, leaving the rest of each snippet largely intact. The modified files continued to be served through Optimizely’s delivery infrastructure, meaning the browser received malicious code from a source the affected websites were already configured to trust.

Report URI documented several loader variations. One loaded a remote payload from 1688360[REDACTED BY DNB EDITORS TO GET PAST GOOGLE FILTERS]. Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned and then reinfected, indicating that the attacker still had the ability to modify that project during the cleanup effort. Some affected customers served their Optimizely snippets from their own domains rather than directly from cdn.optimizely.com. As a result, hunting only for requests to cdn.optimizely.com would miss some affected implementations; investigations should identify the Optimizely project snippets in use, including customer-hosted copies.

Response from Optimizely

Optimizely’s status-page notice states that an unauthorized party “exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation,” and that the company has “fixed the vulnerability” and removed the injected code from affected projects. However, the public reporting does not clarify how the attacker obtained write access to so many unrelated customer projects. This question remains unanswered in the available public evidence. The Optimizely-specific injection was first observed on November 16, at 04:21 UTC in a BBC snippet, according to the timeline reported by Scott Helme. Report URI tracked cleanup throughout that same day: by 21:52 UTC, only one of the 188 infected snippets it had identified still contained the code. StepSecurity estimates that most sites were exposed for about 16 hours.

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