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Disrupting Largest Residential Proxy Network

This week Google and partners took action to disrupt what we believe is one of the largest residential proxy networks in the world, the IPIDEA proxy network. IPIDEA’s proxy infrastructure is a little-known component of the digital ecosystem leveraged by a wide array of bad actors. This disruption, led by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) in partnership with other teams, included taking legal action to take down domains used to control devices and proxy traffic through them. Technical intelligence on discovered IPIDEA software development kits (SDKs) and proxy software was shared with platform providers, law enforcement, and research firms to help drive ecosystem-wide awareness and enforcement. These SDKs, which are offered to developers across multiple mobile and desktop platforms, surreptitiously enroll user devices into the IPIDEA network. Google also ensured Google Play Protect, Android’s built-in security protection, automatically warns users and removes applications known to incorporate IPIDEA SDKs, and blocks any future install attempts.

We believe our actions have caused significant degradation of IPIDEA’s proxy network and business operations, reducing the available pool of devices for the proxy operators by millions. Because proxy operators share pools of devices using reseller agreements, we believe these actions may have downstream impact across affiliated entities. In contrast to other types of proxies, residential proxy networks sell the ability to route traffic through IP addresses owned by internet service providers (ISPs) and used to provide service to residential or small business customers. By routing traffic through an array of consumer devices all over the world, attackers can mask their malicious activity by hijacking these IP addresses. This generates significant challenges for network defenders to detect and block malicious activities.

Google Threat Intelligence Group’s (GTIG) research shows that these proxies are overwhelmingly misused by bad actors. IPIDEA has become notorious for its role in facilitating several botnets: its software development kits played a key role in adding devices to the botnets, and its proxy software was then used by bad actors to control them. This includes the BadBox2.0 botnet we took legal action against last year, and the Aisuru and Kimwolf botnets more recently. We also observe IPIDEA being leveraged by a vast array of espionage, crime, and information operations threat actors. In a single seven-day period in January 2026, GTIG observed over 550 individual threat groups that we track utilizing IP addresses tracked as IPIDEA exit nodes to obfuscate their activities, including groups from China, DPRK, Iran and Russia. The activities included access to victim SaaS environments, on-premises infrastructure, and password spray attacks.

In addition, residential proxies pose a risk to the consumers whose devices are joined to the proxy network as exit nodes. These users knowingly or unknowingly provide their IP address and device as a launchpad for hacking and other unauthorized activities.

GTIG’s analysis of these applications confirmed that IPIDEA proxy did not solely route traffic through the exit node device; they also sent traffic to the device in order to compromise it. Our analysis of residential proxy networks found that many well-known residential proxy brands are not only related but are controlled by the actors behind IPIDEA. This includes the following ostensibly independent proxy and VPN brands: 360 Proxy (360proxy.com), 922 Proxy (922proxy.com), ABC Proxy (abcproxy.com), Cherry Proxy (cherryproxy.com), Door VPN (doorvpn.com), Galleon VPN.

To read the complete article see: Disrupting Largest Residential Proxy Network.

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.