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CyberPower PowerPanel Exploited to Run Malicious Code on Domain Controller

CyberPower PowerPanel Exploited to Run Malicious Code on Domain Controller

CyberPower PowerPanel Exploited to Run Malicious Code on Domain Controller

An attacker has abused CyberPower’s PowerPanel Business (PBB) software to run malicious scripts on a domain controller, the server that controls logins across a Windows network, turning a power management feature into a remote command channel. Symantec detailed the intrusion in research published on November 18. PowerPanel Business manages uninterruptible power supply (UPS) battery backups. Because organizations rely on it to shut servers down safely in an outage, it often runs on important systems such as hypervisors and database and file servers. Administrators can configure PPB to launch a script when it detects a power problem, and its service executes that script with SYSTEM privileges, the highest level in Windows. This means the attacker could run code without a software bug and without setting up a service or scheduled task. 🚨

According to Symantec, the attacker uploaded scripts through the web console, then used them to stage an antivirus killer and copy the Active Directory database, which stores credentials for every account on the network. A persistent implant followed, loaded through DLL sideloading, in which a legitimate program is tricked into loading a malicious library. The attacker leaned mostly on tools that ship with Windows, and the data collection scripts were rewritten several times during the intrusion. Symantec interpreted this trial and error as a sign of a human operator working live. 🔍

Symantec did not disclose how the attacker gained access to the network or the PPB console. Possible routes to the console included stolen administrator credentials and previously disclosed weaknesses in the product, such as a default administrator password, hard-coded credentials, and a file upload flaw. Symantec noted that the feature “simply accepts a script, stores it, and runs it as SYSTEM.” Since PPB often resides on the machines an attacker would prize most, it urged organizations to treat power-management software with the same suspicion as remote administration tools. ⚠️

Its advice included limiting console access to specific administrator machines, keeping the console off the internet, replacing the default administrator password, and ensuring systems are patched. It also recommended organizations check the folders PPB runs scripts from, assume any unfamiliar script is malicious, reset Active Directory credentials if indicators arise, and protect power-management hosts as high-value systems. 🔒

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