30 Years of Gatekeeper Asymmetry Doom The Paradox that Makes Powerful LLMs More Vulnerable
30 Years of Gatekeeper Asymmetry Doom: The Paradox that Makes Powerful LLMs More Vulnerable
The principle of gatekeeper asymmetry doom in information security states that “If the system vetting adversarial input has strictly less power than the system processing that input, without leveraging some hard problem, this will inevitably lead to doom.” By the mention of ‘leveraging a hard problem’, we mean to exclude e.g. signature verification for binary files, which is many times simpler than executing the file but can still, at least in a certain theoretical world, determine whether the binary is malicious or not. The principle might be phrased more glibly as “every quick sanity check involves either cryptography or a silent prayer.” From now on, rather than writing out “gatekeeper asymmetry doom” every time, we will simply refer to “doom” for short.
A good warm-up example to start with is the one burned into the psyche of every infosec practitioner in some fundamental post-traumatic sense. At some point during the 1990s, the silent thought must have come to someone in the industry that malware was solved. You could collect all the hashes of malicious binaries in a large database and then a gatekeeper, called in this case an “antivirus,” would check each executed binary against the known list of ‘bad’ hashes. The gap between the gatekeeper’s power and the target’s power here was truly huge. The target in this case is the full Turing-complete execution of a binary, and the gatekeeper is a simple observation of whether the binary is in some set of known files. The threat actors’ counter was infamous and trivial: for each compiled binary, randomize the value of some non-load-bearing byte.
Since the days of the simple hash comparison, the gatekeeping models for static analysis have grown more complex and powerful. Perhaps the natural instrument to mention here is the use of pattern matching and regular expressions. This is the paradigm underlying YARA rules, and it acts as a backbone of the binary classification process still to this day. If tools of this kind are fully brought to bear, threat actors would face difficulty as the characteristic subroutines of every malicious binary become a reputational hazard. But eventually, Gatekeeper Asymmetry wins. By this we mean that regular expressions have well-known and theoretically understood limitations: similarly to how they are not powerful enough to parse HTML, they are also not powerful enough to capture the class of assembly subroutines that perform some action, or the class of assembly subroutines that perform some action using some specific algorithm, or even the class of assembly subroutines that perform some action as implemented by some specific sequence of instructions that have been subject to moderate mutation. The projected end state would be some malware generation process that takes care to inject this moderate mutation into every subroutine: a new kind of polymorphism.
We conclude with a recommendation that “doomed” attack surfaces should be noticed and the gap be narrowed down as much as possible, by upgrading gatekeeper power or making use of its existing power more comprehensively. We note that frontier LLMs (with scaffolding, extended reasoning, code execution in the chain of thought, and so on) have significant power in this sense and can meaningfully contribute to narrowing “doom” gaps, though ultimately, they themselves are still subject to this principle.